My good friend, Bruce is an animal tracker. He lives in Northern Alberta, Canada, outside a teeny tiny town. I went to visit him last winter wanting to trade in the serious winter blues of 40-below Edmonton for any other kind of winter blues that might be on offer. He warned me that some people find the bush really boring. He meant two things by that remark:
Then there were the wolf tracks. Beautiful, regal, distinct. "I've tracked many but never seen one" Bruce tells me. A lone male wolf. Bruce knows because of the piss patterns. (See Helen Chadwick's "pissflowers": http://fineart.ac.uk/works/bt0005/). A wolf just bee-lining it across an open frozen lake. How fast, Bruce wondered? How far ahead of us is he? He checked the depth that the fur pads went into the snow, the degree of drag on the back steps and the width of the gait, for an answer. Very fast. Next question arises: Is he in pursuit? More things to find out: Are there prey tracks ahead, or will we come upon something he's been tracking downwind, perpendicular, and will meet at a perfect kill site? We ski faster, forensically. Bruce stops. Takes a picture. He seems to be taking a picture of nothing. He points down at nothing. I look. "There," he says, "the two left prints are deep on their left sides and the two right prints are shallow on theirs. He slowed down a little here," he says, "and looked to his left." What makes a wolf slow and take a look but not stop? A quick scout about gets us one possible answer: A smallish lunch.
The goofy loopy tracks of a snowshoe hare almost cross, but do not cross, the bee-line of the wolf. They stop short, literally. And crouch. The rabbit paws are distinct and deep in the snow: a crouched rabbit makes those tracks. Bruce surmises this: The wolf is on a mean clip across the lake and the hare is clued out, meandering. All of a sudden the hare senses the wolf and tries to camouflage himself as a snow mound. Does the wolf chase the hare and eat it? Nope. Does the wolf stop and freak the hare out? Nope. Does the wolf look left? Yes. Wolf sees Rabbit, but doesn't always eat Rabbit. I didn't know that about Wolf-Man. I wonder though if Rabbit knew that about Wolf? Still more questions emerge: Where is the wolf going so fast with a full stomach? Is he going toward something, or away from something? Away. What is after the wolf?
Maybe from a hunter. A human in hot pursuit. Is it not, in fact, us he's on the run from?
Spending time with a tracker is like going down the rabbit hole into the main ballroom of one's perception and finding a big party underway. The world we move around in is fully occupied, fully inscribed, at the same time and in the same places as we find ourselves, by our animal, feathered, vegetable and insect kin. We mostly don't know enough about them to even notice their company, let alone their signs. Some of us don't want to know, especially about the parasite pals. Usually we are too busy thinking about something else, or searching for something we think and hope will be there, or making noises thus not hearing them call the name they have for us, or sticking too closely to the path. Literally and metaphorically. But once we do notice, become aware, learn the rudiments of their signs, the questions which those encounters pose, are very good ones. They too, open unexpectedly onto other underground tunnels of further questions. Possible answers to those questions shake our sense of the world: a shaking orders of magnitude greater than one would think a little hunkering rabbit capable of. Tom Brown Jr.
writes about awareness, the quality of quiet that lets the natural world come close, losing oneself among non-human kin. That all seems possible and good. But equally possible, as the wolf experience above shows, is that the cultivated openness to the Other such as tracking permits & requires, can sometimes lead us right back to ourselves. But it is a very different version of ourselves than the picture of our selves we carry around with us, and present to the world, as it were, from the inside out. It is as though the animal others we are trying to read reads the backs of our greeting card and ask us pertinent questions about those parts of ourselves we somehow can't even see.
II. Tracking the tracker
In this paper, qua philosopher, I want to track for the reader a recent sequence of readings and writings of mine, but not just my own. I want to show a map of an intellectual meander outward toward animality and toward the question of the ethical status of the nonhuman animal. With hindsight, I can now spy the blind spots, blind corners, of my pursuit.
Through this exercise, I want to try to illustrate how that path of questions about the non-human animal in the first instance permits a suspension of attention to ourselves-the human animalas contested moral subjects and an oblivion about that suspension. But, in the second instance, the questions posed by the animal, on the meander outward, lead to other questions which in turn make our oblivion so crystal clear that it calls our apparent naiveté and goodwill into question.
The result is, literally, a sudden about-face which (re)contests ourselves-the human animal-as moral subjects. An implication of my exercise and analysis is to call into question our adequacy, as epistemic agents, to the task of what feminist epistemologists call "critical self-reflection"; that is, knowing oneself more fully by perceiving what one is up to in ones line of questioning, catching oneself unawares in particular. My experience of tracking the animal and then finding myself suddenly being tracked, casts what I hope is a useful doubt on the capacity of the isolated rational agent to accomplish a making-visible of what is invisible about her own perceptions; that is, reveals the very real limits of her evidence-gathering capacities. I want above all to argue that our own blind spots are disabled and critical self-reflexivity becomes possible, not by a willing and able isolated self but by a strange-making encounter with a non-self who stops us in our tracks.
III. Animality: Starting (out)points
I regularly teach a course on Ethics and Animals. It's a second year philosophy course which focuses on the arguments, ontological and moral, which have been offered throughout the course of Western thinking, on what it is that makes a being the kind of being deserving of the status of moral subject: having a nature and a telos, rationality, sentience, membership in a community, capacity for a sense of justice, complex tool-use, a sense of self, time, etc. By extension, our work in that class is to assess whether or not the demarcations between human and non-human animal maintained by, for instance, René Descartes, and the conduct that such a I also teach an advanced Ethics course which covers some very different territory; that of recent Continental thinkers on the question of responsibility: Levinas, Irigaray, Heidegger, Derrida, Bataille, Butler & Cixous. Common to these thinkers is their existentialist-inspired attempts to articulate a capacity to be responsible not in terms of a self-sufficient rationally-cued moral agent setting out on the high path to the moral life but in terms of some kind of a concrete, shattering encounter with a genuine not-me, not-us-marginal, difference, non-knowledge, absence, silence, infinite, death and vulnerability. We talk a lot about "the Other" and mostly we are talking about a human other. On occasion, though, one of my students asks whether or not an encounter with a dolphin or a leaking tap could count as the kind of confrontation event that precipitates responsible capacity in a human subject, a human subject. Of course, this is just the kind of direction that some of these thinkers, especially Jacques Derrida, eventually took their own thoughts, once they had considered further the implications of, for example, the 'Face-to- Charging a text, any text, with an omission is an onerous charge to defend since there are different kinds of absences, different forms of silence. Like any critic, Taylor must first establish the empirical claim that the non-human animal is missing from the ethical landscape Butler paints. She does that. But on its own it has no more interest or traction than the observation that PhaenEx Descartes didn't say much about feminist rights. The charge starts to get some teeth only when we make the case that a writer could have, and on her own terms, but did not.
The second thing Taylor needed to do, then, is thus establish the fact that a Butlerian ethical landscape could, without grotesque distortion, include the precarious lives of animals as among those to whom we (also) have duties of attention and responsibility. This is not quite the same as complaining that Judith Butler could have, in Precarious Life, but didn't. The charge is more diffuse. It is to say that such-and-such a philosophy contains within it the means to make just such an extension or application, but/and the author didn't happen to focus on these possible implications of her work. It is to suggest that Butler might have included animals, and would be in principle amenable to that extension and those concerns taken up by others. Indeed Taylor writes that "there is nothing about Butler's ethics which would justify an exclusion of nonhuman animals." This confirms that there are components in Butler's system which, when thought through again, pursued a bit further along, allow but perhaps do not require, animals to be included in the moral addressees among the vulnerable and dehumanized human lives that Butler does focus on. This version of the charge of missing the point lets Butler off the hook by crediting features of her work with containing the kinds of principles required to do the kind of work that Taylor and others, but possibly not Butler, wants to do. The two features of Precarious Life Taylor highlights to ground this claim of legitimate extensibility are: 1) Butler's insistence that the 'Face' (the site of ethical address) addresses us non-or pre-linguistically ("the sound of language evacuating its sense") which clearly leaves room for non-linguistic beings like wolves or otters to be among the kinds of beings we could be addressed by, ethically; and 2) Butler's explicit claim that what makes us (all) vulnerable is "the sheer fact of being embodied"; hence it follows that all embodied beings are on a Butlerian ethical landscape, including us, the darned parasites, and the mice men and mice ladies.
Having established the basic philosophical integrity of extending Butlerian insights into the question of the animal, Taylor takes us through two working examples of texts which feature the animal as ethical vector: J.M. Coetzee's Disgrace and The Lives of Animals. Through these examples, she fleshes out Butler's (and Levinas') own insights that "experiences of violation, of exposure to violence, however negative, can thus be used as a resource for ethical and political reflection" (Precarious Life 29). She maps the "negative" experiences of the protagonist of Disgrace, David Lurie, a perpetrator of violence, witness to violence and recipient of violenceviolences involving human and non-human characters in all positions-through to Lurie's metamorphosis into being the kind of human being with a new capacity to "recognize that even in its degradation and vulnerability, in fact precisely because of them, man [sic] shares a kinship with the animal" ("The Precarious Lives of Animals" 18). Taylor shows Lurie's eventual ability to, to use Butler's own words, "refuse the cycle of revenge in the name of justice … to take stock of how the world has become formed in this way in order to form it anew, and in the direction of non-violence" (Precarious Life 17), and that Lurie accomplishes this ethical growth through the route of animality. Instructively, Taylor wants us to see Lurie not as a fictional exception making a distant and mildly interesting philosophical point, but as a concrete example of the kind of complex beings all humans presently are: the kind of animal-being who manages to fail to "mention" or "notice" that animality but nevertheless comes to be in the world as a more responsible member by virtue of responding to that very animality. In other words, Coetzee's and thus Taylor's work are of a piece with the very ethical projects that Levinas, Butler, Derrida, PhaenEx Cixous and Sartre have been mounting, and, as I mentioned above, of a piece with the directions that some of these thinkers are taking their own thinking. Taylor's point is strong.
What Taylor then does for the remainder of the paper is to strike out in a new direction, making the case, for her own purposes and leaving her own signature on that purpose, that the ethical landscape insofar as it is a territory marked by duties to the vulnerable should include the lives of animal-vulnerables. For these lives are, according to Taylor, subject to an "even vaster and more systematic violence which occurs every day" (8), lives "which we have made dependent on us through domestication, and on which we depend in many ways for our way of But let's stop chasing that set of tracks and circle back to another question Taylor raised a while back, but we did not pursue: that Butler's omission is a symptom of something, and that something is connected to a philosophically rich motive, even an unconscious one.
In several places Taylor does make the much stronger charge against Butler: that Butler's discussion of, and focus on human but not animal derealization is a sustained, repeated (8), 'implicit exclusion' (12) and 'repeated removal' (3). That is to say, not a simple forgiveable omission to be recuperated by another thinker in subsequent ethical work. Not naïve. Under this charge, the fact that the animal is not an ethical event in Butler's ethical philosophy becomes itself of some philosophical interest, not just what can be done, by others, with what was omitted.
Taylor makes the bold suggestion that the omission "itself derealizes the lives and deaths of nonhuman animals." She is suggesting that the work she would like to do to realize the vulnerability of the lives of animals does not take place on a neutral platform extending out from such ethical tracts as Precarious Life but that the ethical tract itself undermines and works against such a project in the first place. This audacious charge sweeps us out recklessly into the vicinity of Lake Foucault.
Foucault made us-and by "us" I mean talkers and thinkers-permanently nervous. Or, if we aren't, we ought to be. Because he suggested and then demonstrated that it is entirely possible that the form of a text is capable of undermining the very content that it promotes. And in doing so entirely below our radar, making us complicit hypocrites. Oblivious and sanctimonious, at once. Taylor's hard hitting charge made me start to squirm because it raised the question whether it is not possible that widespread conscious or unconscious disavowals of responsibility to animal lives within a discourse which avows concern, avows responsibility for the vulnerable, might not itself be participating in the exploitation of vulnerability in general, and the increase of exactly what it denounces? Since my teaching has form, rhythm and content; since my reading has form, reading and content, is it not possible that some of the same slippage is enabled by my projects on behalf of extending moral community to animals? I mention this here not to solve the question that popped its head up when I was reading Taylor's charges. I honestly wish I had never seen that head pop up. I mention it to mark out loud, and without shelter, how suddenly with this one suggestion we were in a different kind of territory altogether: and our own reading, (mine in this case), felt uncomfortably close to the very thing I thought was at a comfortable distance from. I can hear its breathing, behind me. Precarious Life is relying explicitly on just such kinds of rhetorical questions about the invisibilizing and visibilizing discourse dynamics. Speaking to the impossibility of saying anything against the Bush Administration in the aftermath of 9/11 without such queries being heard as victim-blaming and in solidarity with terrorists, Butler writes:
One way a hegemonic understanding…is achieved is through circumscribing what will and will not be admissible as part of the public sphere itself….To produce what will constitute the public sphere; however, it is necessary to control the way in which people see, how they hear, what they see. The constraints are not only on content-certain images of dead bodies in Iraq for instance-but on what "can" be heard, read, seen, felt and known. The public sphere is constituted in part by what can appear and the regulation of the sphere of appearance is one way to establish what will count as reality, and what will not. It is also a way of establishing whose lives can be marked as lives, and whose deaths will count as deaths. (Precarious Life xx-xxi) Given that Butler is using Foucault in part as her compass, it is odd to discover in Precarious Life a predilection to describe discursive "production" as something they do: they, in this case, being the Bush administration and mainstream media. Sovereign power and its main trick:
prohibition. But, after Foucault we know that other forms and modes of power-disciplinary and biopower-work directly in and through a "multiplicity of force relations immanent in the sphere in which they operate and which constitute their own organization" (History of Sexuality 92); a "general matrix" (94) in which we ourselves are embedded, and operate. These other descriptions of power ask about the complicity of readers and writers of texts in the uptake and dissemination of hegemonies, in addition to our express resistances to it. Though perhaps warping the public sphere in quite different ways than the "Bush Administration" can and does, we are always already involved in its production, not immunized from it and at a safe distance with a nevertheless excellent vantage point to critique it. Sovereign power is easier to point to because you point away from the self to indicate its whereabouts.
To sum up where we have come so far: Butler is producing a widely-read book for the public domain to contest one narrative about what deserves the grief work of that very public. 
IV. Our tracks come upon themselves
"Skin me Brer Fox," says he. "Snatch out my eyeballs, tear out my ears by the roots," says he, "But please, Brer Fox, don't fling me in that briar patch, " says he.
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In continental ethical theory, the "question of the animal" is receiving the complex, sustained treatment I agree it deserves. What that discussion insists upon, and what Taylor rightly uses as her leverage against Butler's limited vision, is that the sphere of the ethical, the moral community, cannot simply be presumed to be circumscribed by: rationality, reciprocity, fungibility, proximity, utility. Though each of these concepts play a role in what we call "the ethical," taken as a cluster, they seem to consistently leave something or someone important out.
Derrida's work on responsible mourning, and Levinas' work on respectful objectality are efforts to draw our attention to some compelling feature of the ethical terrain which traditional principles and approaches have nothing much to say about. These efforts keep open the discussion about animality and ethicality. The question of the animal can enter, and stay on, the ethical terrain because continental theorists refuse to declare in advance who or what counts; and refuse "the human" as the primary moral subject, the exemplar of what counts. Butler takes responsiveness to suffering and vulnerability as the basis of the ethical. Levinas insists that our ethical responsiveness begins with what comes to us with force, even without comprehension or preparation. Deleuze recommends becoming-minoritarian as the ethical life, and takes whole chunks of life ("assemblages") as the units of possible transformation, not a single bit like an autonomous human agent. Paul Patton's advice on how to develop respectful relationships with dependent or juvenile others happens to be about horses, but it could be about other kinds of beings. All these approaches begin with an ethical moment, or event (like suffering) which involves us and calls for our response qua responsible beings. That such moments or events are phenomena emitted from other beings than our fellow skiing human, and signs for other beings than just us, means that these theoretical perspectives include from the outset more than just the human. They are not, except for our one truck in the parking lot, empty.
A meta-question, though, suddenly comes up out of nowhere. If the moral terrain is opened up in new and inclusive ways by these starting-points, which do not a priori name the members and non-members of the sphere of moral concern, then who, or what, is still missing from our view? In principle, nothing should be out of sight, nothing should catch us unawares.
And yet, we only ever follow tracks when we move, and leave others unheeded. Only certain kinds of "new" moral questions come upon us, and take our time and attention. As I have been describing, the "question of the animal" is receiving a great deal of attention and treatment. So much that I almost don't notice that we have passed directly from the "question of the human" (Iraqis, sans-papiers) to the "question of the animal" without having passed through, or touched down anywhere on the vast, populous terrain that stretches between these two categories. Among the occupants of that middle distance is the human fetus. seeing a big hole where the magnolia tree I loved used to live (and scaffolding to fix the soffits on the building it stood in front of, in that hole); news that I was going to have a "little sister"; news that the Baghdad museum had been sacked and looted and American troops nearby did nothing to stop it; 2 news that the Taliban had bombed the ancient Bamiyan Buddhas; 3 and the news that I was pregnant and didn't want to be pregnant.
4
Just as Taylor-Butler-Levinas-Derrida intend us to notice, a capacity to be absolutely and totally punctured by these incoming launches is a gift, an opportunity for me not to recoil from the world and react with defensiveness to its sudden life-inverting assault on the body, the senses, the sense of where one stands in the world in relation to everything else. Like the wolf showing us that we are what it already knows, unwanted pregnancy is a moment in which one can reflect upon the ways in which not only our bodies, senses and relations are shifting and vulnerable, but that many other kinds of 'ontologically distinct' others are similarly vulnerable to impaction: a statue to religious rage, a tree to utility, desire to more desire, boys to drunk drivers, museums to hatred, beloveds to cancer, pets to car tires, husbands to failings and bad thinking, parents to something other than the children they already have, bodies to more bodies (fertility).
And, just as the idea of these events leads one out onto an open lake to discover them, it is only really in the corporeal encounter and reception of such facts, in one's present, in the struggle to refuse to accept it as one's own truth, that the deeper ethical insights available in these "truths" get up and run in our lives. As Butler, Derrida, and Levinas remind us, the task is not to suppress such events, and prevent awareness about these events, but to learn from their hitting us on the and I pointed it out to you…as among the things I see on the terrain around my lived moral compass (though I thought about not pointing to it). As if to do so, to ask it and point it out-the unborn human-would be to plunge me instantly into "complicitousness with the presumed enemy" (Precarious Life 9). In this case, speaking out loud as a feminist female who enjoys the liberty of abortion choice and OHIP, the presumed enemy would be the presumed pro-life religious right species whose very leverage is gained by an insistence on the sanctity of life of the life of the fetus, the precarious vulnerability of that life to the actions of the pregnant woman carrying it, and the impactfulness of abortion on the lives of all intimate to that choice.
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A loud squawk in my head tells me to keep quiet, hunker down low. The self-censure is not uneducated.
Sometimes the "stigma" that could attach to me by saying this out loud is not the workings of wildly untrained, paranoid imagination. I have seen the kill sites of individuals who try to raise again the question of the fetus from a new angle. I am confident that among the ramifications of my doing so will be negative, dangerous. But sometimes the danger does pass, and it wasn't the danger you thought it was going to be… { } Thankfully, I see a bit of a trail to reorient myself to a safe shore, in Butler's own words.
She reminds us of the workings of hegemony, and what it takes for us all to not collapse back into the very systems which generate the unworkable, unimaginative, violence-perpetuating binaries we are, as political theorists and activists, trying to speak out against oppression and live our lives as witnesses to a better, more complete vision of collective life. Listen quietly to what she writes of the inability of dissidents to comment on 9/11 in light of American imperialism:
We tend to dismiss any effort at explanation as if to explain these events would be to accord them rationality, as if to explain these events would involve us in a sympathetic identification with the oppressor, as if to understand these events would involve building a justificatory framework for them. Our fear of understanding a point of view belies a deeper fear that we shall be taken up by it, find it contagious, become infected in a morally perilous way by the thinking of the presumed enemy. (Precarious Life 8)
Can you hear and see, what I said about the fetus, between those lines, which are not about fetuses? That our efforts to dismiss any efforts at explanation of the significance of the fetus that might include the fact of shared vulnerability, including the vulnerability of the fetus…that attempts to rethink the nature of the fetus seems to accord the act of abortion a rationality as if it is only a murder…that speaking about the complex trails around unwanted conception seems to open us up to a charge of identification with anti-feminist religious right, the very pole which feminists and abortion activists have fought, without respite, for almost 30 years…and that all of this belies a deeper fear. A fear, which tracking demonstrates, not only can not be diminished,
